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ONE LAW TO CONTROL THEM ALL: 
INTERNATIONAL MERGER ANALYSIS IN 
THE WAKE OF GE/HONEYWELL 
Kyle Robertson* 
Abstract: The proposed merger of General Electric and Honeywell In-
ternational, two U.S. owned and operated companies, was blocked on an 
international level by the European Commission even after its domestic 
approval. Despite the closeness of U.S. and EU antitrust laws, regulators 
in both countries reached opposite conclusions regarding the effects of 
the merger. This case highlights the complexities of international merger 
analysis in the absence of a global competition policy and the dangers 
that inherently exist in the current regulatory landscape. This has made it 
clear that countries with restrictive merger guidelines can become the 
gatekeepers for large scale international mergers. Specifically, China has 
recently enacted antitrust legislation that may grant them the power of ul-
timate decision in mergers that cross their boundaries, even if Chinese 
involvement is only a small component of the overall merger. 
Introduction 
 On July 3, 2001, the European Commission (Commission) blocked 
a proposed merger between General Electric (GE) and Honeywell In-
ternational, two U.S. owned and operated corporations.1 GE/Honey-
well was the first U.S. based merger cleared by the United States and 
prohibited by the European Union (EU).2 Despite the striking similari-
ties between U.S. and EU antitrust laws,3 the initial prohibition of the 
merger was upheld on appeal by the European Court of First Instance 
                                                                                                                      
* Kyle Robertson is a Senior Note Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. The author would like to thank Chris Franciose for his assistance during 
the editing process. 
1 See Case T–210/01, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm’n, 2005 ECR II-5575. The European 
Court of First Instance also announced a judgment in a separate Honeywell appeal (Case 
T-209/01), which was dismissed largely on technical grounds. George Stephanov Georgiev, 
Bridging the Divide? The European Court of First Instance Judgment in GE/Honeywell, 31 Yale J. 
Int’l L. 518, 518 (2006). 
2 Eleanor M. Fox, The European Court’s Judgment in GE/Honeywell—Not a Poster Child 
for Comity or Convergence, 20 SPG Antitrust 77, 77 (2006). 
3 See Hon. Pamela Jones Harbour, Developments in Competition Law in the European Union 
and the United States: Harmony and Conflict, 19 SPG Int’l L. Practicum 3, 8 (2006). 
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(CFI).4 This decision was based on aspects of the merger that were con-
sidered potentially pro-competitive by U.S. authorities, but viewed as 
monopolistic by the European court.5 The net effect of the EU decision 
was that GE and Honeywell were prevented from merging in both the 
United States and in the European Union,6 highlighting the economic 
pitfalls that can result from even slight differences in States’ competi-
tion policies.7 
 This Note provides an overview of the differing merger analyses 
performed within the United States and the European Union in re-
gards to the GE/Honeywell case, with particular attention to how diver-
gent findings can occur in states with such similar competition laws. It 
next considers how other major economic players, such as China, are 
currently developing their competition policies, and how such poli-
cies may affect U.S. corporations domestically and abroad. Lastly, this 
Note analyzes the hypothetical dangers that surround a State’s ability 
to enact strict antitrust regulations in an effort to become the baseline 
regulator of international mergers. Given these concerns, the best 
solution to such a “hold-up” scenario may be extensive development 
of global competition policy facilitated through the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO). 
I. Background 
 There is no global agreement on competition policy with regard to 
merger analysis, leaving states to regulate their own economies through 
individualized antitrust regulations.8 Because a multinational corpora-
tion is subject to the laws of every state in which it operates, a multina-
tional merger is subject to an analysis by the regulating authorities in 
each state in which it will be conducted.9 These merger analyses are 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Fox, supra note 2. The appellate judgment upheld the prohibition of the merger 
in several respects, which brought EU competition analysis closer to that of the United 
States. See Georgiev, supra note 1, at 520. 
5 See Fox, supra note 2. The merger of GE and Honeywell had the potential to allow for 
bundled combinations of their products, at potentially lowered prices. The U.S. approach 
viewed the merged entities’ economic incentive to reduce prices as favorable and pro-
competitive. Alternatively, the European Union took a different stance and determined 
that the lowered prices that may have resulted from strategic behavior were not considered 
efficiencies, but instead were anticompetitive. See Donna E. Patterson & Carl Shapiro, 
Trans-Atlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes and Lessons, 1 (Nov. 12, 2001), http:// 
faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/divergence.pdf. 
6 William Drozdiak, European Union Kills GE Deal, Wash. Post, Jul. 4, 2001, at A1. 
7 See Fox, supra note 2; Drozdiak, supra note 6. 
8 See Harbour, supra note 3, at 4. 
9 See Drozdiak, supra note 6. 
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conducted independently within each state, in accordance with their 
own unique concerns, policies, and laws.10 There is no obligation of 
deference to the antitrust decision of another state regarding the same 
merger, even if that State is the home of one or both corporations.11 
When one state determines that the proposed merger would be anti-
competitive and potentially pose an economic detriment to its own 
market, the effect of this decision stretches beyond its jurisdiction and 
will preclude the merger globally.12 
A. Transatlantic Divergence: GE/Honeywell 
 The proposed merger between GE and Honeywell is a prominent 
example of the divergent routes a merger analysis may take in different 
states.13 Despite numerous cases of transatlantic cooperation during 
merger analyses, the United States and the European Union rendered 
contradictory evaluations.14 The facts surrounding the corporations’ 
roles in their respective markets led the United States and the Euro-
pean Union to differing interpretations in their competition analyses.15 
GE was the primary manufacturer of engines for large commercial air-
craft, and Honeywell was a leading supplier of certain equipment used 
in jet aircraft.16 One of the products Honeywell supplied was jet engine 
starters, a necessary component for commercial jet engine manufac-
turers such as GE.17 Furthermore, GE Capital’s leasing subsidiary was 
the world’s largest purchaser of airplanes.18 This subsidiary had a policy 
of buying only airplanes that were fitted with GE engines.19 
 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) looked at these facts and 
found none of the problems that the CFI considered serious enough 
to prohibit the merger.20 The CFI upheld the prohibition in part by 
considering its potential to facilitate leveraging and package discount-
                                                                                                                      
10 See Harbour, supra note 3, at 4. 
11 See Fox, supra note 2, at 80. 
12 See Drozdiak, supra note 6. 
13 See Georgiev, supra note 1. 
14 See id. 
15 See Fox, supra note 2, at 78. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 William Kolasky, GE/Honeywell: Narrowing, but Not Closing, the Gap, 20 SPG Anti-
Trust 69, 71 (2006). 
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ing.21 The DOJ approved the GE/Honeywell merger, dismissing fears 
of competitive harm that would form the basis of the EU decision.22 
In fact, the DOJ viewed these effects of package discounting and re-
duced pricing to be efficient and competitive.23 In a major diver-
gence, the facts concerning GE’s classification as “market dominant” 
in the European Union did not support a similar finding in the 
United States.24 Although the statutory language for classification as 
“market dominant” is strikingly similar between these states,25 the dif-
fering interpretations and applications highlight the separation be-
tween regulation in theory and in practice.26 The EU decision prohib-
ited the GE/Honeywell merger both in the European Union and in 
the United States, which is particularly disturbing when considering 
the closeness of their antitrust regulations in an international con-
text.27 
B. Developing Antitrust Regulations Worldwide 
 Despite the absence of definitive international antitrust regula-
tions, there exists a network of cooperative agreements that touch on 
important aspects of competition policy.28 These agreements tend to 
focus on restrictive business practices that are considered harmful to 
international trade.29 Some WTO agreements, in particular the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have possible applica-
tions to anti-competitive business practices.30 Unfortunately, signifi-
cant drawbacks in using these provisions as an alternative to a 
framework agreement by the WTO have limited their applicability as a 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Case T–210/01, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm’n, 2005 ECR II-5575, 342–58; Fox, supra 
note 2, at 78; Georgiev, supra note 1. 
22 See Fox, supra note 2, at 78. 
23 See id.; Georgiev, supra note 1, at 519. 
24 See Fox, supra note 2, at 79. 
25 See infra Part II.A. 
26 See Kolasky, supra note 20, at 72; Patterson & Shaprio, supra note 5, at 7; infra Part 
II.A. 
27 See infra Part II.A. The standards of merger review in the European Union were 
changed after the decision in GE/Honeywell to bring them in line with the merger review 
standards in the U.S. Clayton Act. Harbour, supra note 3, at 8. 
28 Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, Pa-
per for the London School of Economics Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in 
South Africa, 5–6, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/internationalTradePolicyUnit/pdf/inter- 
nationalCompetitionPolicyAndTheWorldTradeOrganization.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2008). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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global competition policy.31 Most notably, attempts to apply the GATT 
in such a manner have forced the WTO to judge the acceptability of 
states’ individual competition laws, ultimately leading to failed appli-
cations.32 Further, none of these agreements offer guidelines or pro-
cedures for analyzing a merger or its effects on competition.33 There-
fore, the responsibility for regulation of competition policy has 
ultimately been left to individual states.34 
 Unlike the United States and the European Union, which have 
established antitrust regimes, many states lack full-scale competition 
policies.35 Often, these states rely on scattered laws, regulations, and 
provisional rules to provide interim antitrust regulation.36 China is 
one such state that employed provisional measures while attempting 
to bring its full-scale Anti-Monopoly Law37 into effect.38 China’s in-
terim framework for antitrust regulation, known as the Provisional 
Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by For-
eign Investors (Provisional Rules), added important sections as re-
cently as 2003.39 The full-scale Anti-Monopoly Law entered the draft-
ing stages in 1994, with the hope of becoming the official competition 
policy of China by the end of 2006.40 The Anti-Monopoly Law came 
into effect in September of 2006, but has yet to be thoroughly tested 
as compared to the Provisional Rules.41 
                                                                                                                      
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 See Woolcook, supra note 32, § 3.0. 
34 See Harbour, supra note 3, at 4. 
35 See generally Fiona A. Schaeffer et al., International Legal Development in Review: 2005 
Business Regulation, 40 Int’l Law. 159 (2006) (discussing recent legal developments in indi-
vidual countries antitrust laws). 
36 See id. 
37 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, New Chinese Merger Control Rules 1, Apr. 2003, 
http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/practices/5356.pdf [hereinafter New Chi-
nese Merger]. 
38 Schaeffer et al., supra note 35, at 166. 
39 Patrick M. Norton & Howard Chao, Mergers and Acquisitions in China 1, 2 (2003) (on 
file with author). 
40 Schaeffer et al., supra note 35, at 167. 
41 Morrison Foerster, China Private Equity/Venture Capital Update, Aug. 2006, http:// 
www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update02236.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2008). 
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II. Discussion 
A. U.S. and EU Domestic Antitrust Policies 
 In the absence of a global competition policy, individual states set 
their own standards for merger review.42 In the United States, the 
primary statutory basis for antitrust regulation is the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.43 Since its inception, U.S. courts have routinely interpreted 
and applied the Act, resulting in settled applications of its princi-
ples.44 Under U.S. law, monopoly power is defined as “the power to 
control prices or exclude competition.”45 In applying this definition, 
case law indicates that although a ninety percent market share is suffi-
cient to give a firm monopoly power, “[I]t is doubtful whether sixty or 
sixty-four percent would be enough.”46 
 In analyzing a prospective merger, the U.S. process focuses on 
law enforcement and emphasizes “such concepts as independence of 
the decision maker from the investigative process, knowledge of and 
an opportunity to rebut the evidence arrayed against the transaction, 
burdens of proof, and the weight to be given to specific types of evi-
dence and economic theories.”47 The DOJ enters into a dialogue with 
the merging entities during the investigative process, giving them op-
portunities to respond to concerns and allegations.48 Finally, the DOJ 
must obtain an order from an independent judicial authority prior to 
blocking a transaction.49 
 The European Union has developed a similar definition of “mar-
ket dominance” under its relevant antitrust regulation, article 82.50 EU 
law defines dominance as “a position of economic strength which en-
ables [an undertaking] to prevent effective competition being main-
tained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers, and, 
ultimately, consumers.”51 EU case law applies a less stringent require-
                                                                                                                      
42 See Harbour, supra note 3, at 4. 
43 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000). 
44 See generally United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (applying Sherman 
Antitrust Act); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945) (same). 
45 Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571. 
46 ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 424; Kolasky, supra note 20, at 72. 
47 Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 9. 
48 See id. 
49 Id. at 11. 
50 See Kolasky, supra note 20, at 71–72. 
51 Id. 
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ment for percentage share of the market to classify as dominant, with a 
52 percent share, as held by GE, being considered enough to behave 
“independently of its competitors, customers, and ultimately, consum-
ers.”52 
 The EU procedure for evaluating a merger focuses on regulation 
and, in theory, includes some of the same checks and balances as the 
U.S. system.53 The standard of proof is, however, much lower in prac-
tice.54 This allowed the Commission to block the merger because, on 
examining a “balance of probabilities,” it was more likely than not to 
be anti-competitive.55 In such situations, the Commission is able to 
enjoin the merger without seeking court approval or bearing the bur-
den of convincing an independent judiciary that the transaction 
would in fact be anticompetitive.56 The Commission’s centralized 
power to investigate and adjudicate is, in application, quite different 
from the distributed nature of duties in the U.S. system.57 
B. Similar Theories Can Yield Dissimilar Applications 
 At its core, the divergence exposed in the GE/Honeywell merger 
appears to be rooted in fundamental substantive and economic doc-
trinal differences.58 These differences surfaced in the interpretations 
extracted from very similar regulatory language.59 In particular, 
GE/Honeywell makes clear that EU regulators will invoke “portfolio ef-
fects theory”60 to block deals that they fear will cause leading firms to 
become even more effective competitors. In contrast, in the United 
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. at 72. 
53 Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 9. 
54 See Georgiev, supra note 1, at 519. 
55 Id. at 520. 
56 See id. at 519–20. 
57 See id. at 520. 
58 Patterson & Shaprio, supra note 5, at 1. 
59 See Kolasky, supra note 20, at 71. 
60 The “portfolio effects” theory, also known as the “portfolio power” or “range effects” 
theory, was first introduced by the Commission in 1996–97. By this time, authorities in the 
United States had already rejected this theory as economically unsound. The anti-
competitive likelihood of portfolio effects is based on the assumption that the combined 
portfolio of products enjoyed by a merged entity allows them to impose exclusive contracts 
on retailers or to force retailers to buy complete lines of products. This portfolio could be 
used to impose brands that a retailer would otherwise not be willing to buy, or allow a 
complete range of products to take up more space on retail shelves in order to limit space 
available to competitors. See Thibaud Verge, Portfolio Effects and Merger Control: Full-line Forc-
ing as an Entry-Deterrence Strategy 2 (Univ. of Southampton CMPO Working Paper, No. 
02/046, Oct. 2003), available at http://www.bris.ac.uk/cmpo/workingpapers/wp46.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2008). 
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States, lower prices resulting from mergers are welcome, even when 
they are predicted to cause leading firms to gain market share.61 Al-
though the substantive basis for the analysis of the merger was similar, 
the procedures in place in the EU greatly contributed to the ability of 
the Commission to block the merger on the grounds of dubious eco-
nomic theory and a weak evidentiary basis.62 
 The theoretical differences underlying U.S. and EU antitrust re-
gimes percolated to the surface through the procedures used in the 
GE/Honeywell analysis.63 The EU decision rested firmly on the belief 
that GE enjoyed a dominant position in the market for jet engines, 
and the European Union used a very different mode of analysis than 
the United States in reaching this conclusion.64 In the United States, 
the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission followed a generally ac-
cepted set of economic inquiries65 in assessing a firm’s competitive 
strength in a market.66 Instead of following such a procedural analysis, 
the European Union assessed GE as dominant due to GE’s recent ac-
quisition of more bidding orders than its competitors, despite the ag-
gressiveness of bidding in the market.67 This ad hoc analysis of GE’s 
market strength allowed the European Union to find dominance in a 
bidding market that necessitated such aggressive bidding.68 “In con-
trast, in the United States, dominance would be found in bidding 
markets when rivals were unable to offer credible, attractive alterna-
tives so that the firm in question was not forced to compete aggres-
                                                                                                                      
61 Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1. 
62 Id. at 2. 
63 See id. at 9. 
64 Id. at 5. 
65 This economic inquiry depends greatly on the frequency of bidding events in the 
market, as evaluation of competition in a market with dozens of bidding events per year is 
quite different from evaluation in a market with one major event every few years. To de-
termine if a supplier has a clear advantage in a bidding market, economists ask a series of 
questions. The typical questions posed are: 
(1) Do multiple suppliers typically enter the bidding competition? (2) Do 
customers consider these suppliers capable of offering good alternatives? (3) 
Have suppliers historically preserved their strengths and capabilities despite 
setbacks? (4) Is bidding vigorous? Are there multiple rounds of bidding in 
which the bids move significantly? Do suppliers offer major concessions to 
win the bidding? (5) Have multiple suppliers shown the ability actually to win 
bids with regularity? and (6) Are multiple suppliers positioned technically to 
remain capable and attractive for upcoming bidding events? 
Id. at 3. 
66 See Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 6. 
67 Id. 
68 See id. at 7. 
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sively to win.”69 Of these differing approaches to evaluating GE’s mar-
ket dominance, it is the U.S. approach that is considered to be 
grounded in solid economics.70 Thus, despite theoretical similarities, 
“[I]n practice [the Commission] was able unilaterally to block the 
GE/Honeywell merger based on dubious and controversial policy 
grounds, demonstrably erroneous economic theory, and speculation 
contrary to the weight of the evidence.”71 
C. Chinese Antitrust Regulations: Concerns Regarding Mergers 
 Even established antitrust regimes can have difficulty in consis-
tently analyzing mergers, and the consistency of application is only 
worsened under more primitive competition policies.72 The practice 
of antitrust merger review in China under the Provisional Rules, and 
potentially under its successor Anti-Monopoly Law, is generally per-
ceived as rudimentary.73 A particularly important section of the Provi-
sional Rules extended the Chinese government’s power to regulate 
not only domestic mergers, but also proposed offshore mergers sub-
ject to specific conditions.74 The term “offshore merger” is left unde-
fined in the Provisional Rules, as are many other important aspects, 
theoretically expanding China’s jurisdiction to include offshore trans-
actions where the merger itself bears no relation to China.75 
 Additionally, the definition of market dominance, a key concept 
in the GE/Honeywell merger, was also left undefined in the Provi-
sional Rules.76 Theoretically, the inference of market dominance 
should be determined by an economic analysis, including market 
share in the relevant market, substitutionability of relevant products, 
and applicable barriers to entry into that specific market.77 Yet, the 
Provisional Rules merely stipulate that mergers and acquisitions may 
not “result in excessive concentration and exclusion or restriction of 
competition and may not disturb the social or economic order or 
                                                                                                                      
69 Id. 
70 Id.; see Kolasky, supra note 20, at 72. 
71 Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 9. 
72 See id. 
73 Schaeffer et al., supra note 35, at 166. 
74 Id. at 166–67. 
75 Id. at 167. 
76 Id. 
77 See id. 
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harm public interests.”78 The current Anti-Monopoly Law does not 
clarify these ambiguities surrounding merger review.79 
 Another problem results from the Anti-Monopoly Law’s absence 
of any details outlining procedures for competition review, including 
a lack of information on how foreign corporations may answer the 
concerns of Chinese regulators.80 Chinese markets have experienced 
dramatic growth recently, making them a hot target for potential ac-
quisitions.81 Although the market seems welcoming to mergers and 
restructuring, the legal implications are significant.82 State ownership 
and control of many large sectors of the economy inject both political 
and social issues into transactions.83 Many of the Anti-Monopoly Law’s 
interpretations and subsequent applications remain untested, making 
China a continually challenging and unpredictable market for merger 
analysis.84 Such ambiguities in the Anti-Monopoly Law allow for the 
defining of market aspects by regulators, giving rise to the potential 
for “undesirable and excessive government intervention on antitrust 
grounds, even where no genuine competitive issue exists.”85 The fun-
damental concern emanating from developing antitrust regimes such 
as China is underscored by GE/Honeywell: if two statutorily similar anti-
trust regimes can reach diametrically opposed conclusions based on 
theoretically similar underpinnings, what is to be inferred from an 
antitrust regime that leaves defining core competition terms to the 
whim of the government’s statutory interpretation?86 
D. A Global “Hold-Up” Situation 
 A multinational corporation is subject to the laws of every state in 
which it operates.87 Thus, particularly troublesome situations may arise 
in the event of international mergers.88 When individual states analyze 
mergers subject only to their own policies and regulations, and the 
prohibition of a merger by any one state can block the transaction 
globally, corporations become effectively bound by the strictest anti-
                                                                                                                      
78 New Chinese Merger, supra note 37, at 1. 
79 See Schaeffer et al., supra note 35. 
80 See New Chinese Merger, supra note 37, at 2. 
81 See Norton & Chao, supra note 39, at 1. 
82 See id. 
83 Id. 
84 See id. 
85 Schaeffer et al., supra note 35, at 167. 
86 See Fox, supra note 2, at 80; Harbour, supra note 3, at 4. 
87 See Drozdiak, supra note 6. 
88 See id. 
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trust regime to which they are subject.89 In recognizing this, a state 
could theoretically obtain exclusive power over regulating international 
mergers by enacting unnecessarily restrictive or artificially ambiguous 
competition policies regarding merger analysis.90 This possibility would 
create, in effect, a “hold-up” situation forcing a corporation to choose 
between forsaking a merger, paying a potentially extortionate fine, or 
ceasing operation within the state altogether.91 
 The possibility of such a scenario could create large incentives for 
states to artificially interpret their antitrust regulations or to enact ever 
more restrictive competition policies.92 This incentive is derived from 
the ability to control the global arena for mergers, the ability to gener-
ate revenue from merger prohibiting fines, and the ability to protect a 
state’s own businesses via regulatory attacks on foreign corporations 
operating domestically.93 This ability to regulate international mergers 
may grant a state the ability to dictate the growth strategies of U.S. cor-
porations both at home and abroad.94 The real dangers posed by this 
problem are exemplified by GE/Honeywell, which painfully demon-
strated the potential problems that can occur with even the most simi-
lar of competition policies and cooperating regulatory authorities.95 
III. Analysis 
 It is generally in the best interest of all states that restrictions on 
global mergers not become yet another tool of international eco-
nomic diplomacy.96 If there were no costs, there would likely be un-
wavering support for WTO-sponsored antitrust policies, especially in 
light of such an international merger bottleneck.97 Unfortunately, the 
costs of an international competition policy are not negligible: con-
cerns exist regarding a bevy of issues such as transparency, existing 
regimes, and developing nations.98 Even given these costs, “It is not so 
much a question of whether but what type of coverage there should 
be of competition in the WTO.”99 With this in mind, support for fur-
                                                                                                                      
89 See id. 
90 See Woolcock, supra note 28, at 9. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 See Harbour, supra note 3, at 8. 
96 See Georgiev, supra note 1, at 523. 
97 See Woolcock, supra note 28. 
98 See id. 
99 Id. 
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thering the regulatory strength of the WTO in regard to international 
mergers must be weighed against the drawbacks.100 
 Although GE/Honeywell illustrated the potential threat of global 
merger restriction, there is no concrete evidence that national com-
petition policies or pre-existing agreements, such as the GATT, cannot 
cope with international markets and mergers.101 Additionally, differ-
ent states have differing needs, depending on their level of develop-
ment and particular idiosyncrasies.102 Countries that have already de-
veloped their antitrust policies will also be unlikely to simply cede 
their sovereignty to an international entity.103 Finally, a strong ration-
ale underlies claims that the WTO should cover trade issues only, and 
that merger regulation may fall outside its purview.104 Given these 
substantial criticisms, it seems that a comprehensive antitrust frame-
work inside the WTO would face a long and potentially futile battle.105 
 In light of these concerns, perhaps a thorough competition policy 
is outside the reach of the WTO, at least in the foreseeable future.106 As 
more states finalize their antitrust regulations, they become less ame-
nable to ceding power to an international regulator.107 Given the only 
worsening problem of inconsistent merger review between states and 
the efficiencies gained through formulating international antitrust 
policies before each state finalizes their own regimes, it behooves the 
WTO to take immediate action.108 The WTO should attempt to over-
come the criticisms blocking international merger regulation; this 
would grant corporations, and thereby consumers, the benefits result-
ing from an environment of global economic stability and uniform-
ity.109 
 The solution to GE/Honeywell and the global “hold-up” situation of 
merger preclusion may not be found in developing substantive anti-
trust regulations at all.110 At the core of GE/Honeywell, despite all of the 
similarities, lay theoretical differences on how to promote economic 
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See Woolcock, supra note 28, at 6. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See Woolcock, supra note 28, at 6. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 See Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 10. 
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efficiency.111 It seems unlikely that a large majority of states could agree 
on the theoretical basis for such regulation, let alone the actual lan-
guage of the policies themselves.112 What then is left for an interna-
tional antitrust framework when the criticisms against such regulations 
seem so valid?113 An approach focusing simply on the procedural analy-
sis of mergers, while eschewing any global substantive requirements, is 
one possibility.114 
 Differences in procedure, ranging from corporate-regulator inter-
action to the application of market dominance theories, were a key 
source of the differences in GE/Honeywell.115 Further, despite strong at-
tempts between U.S. and EU regulators, voluntary cooperation has 
been shown to be inadequate in dealing with policy differences in 
merger analysis.116 To solve these inadequacies, the procedural analysis 
of corporate mergers might best be facilitated via a WTO-regulation 
committee.117 Such a committee would ideally consist of representatives 
from each state directly impacted by the proposed merger, chaired by a 
permanently appointed official.118 This procedural framework could be 
adapted from states with settled antitrust regimes, hopefully blending 
the most desirable aspects from each.119 To hasten the development 
and implementation of such a procedural review committee, no at-
tempt at developing a substantive body of antitrust law should be 
made.120 Instead, the substantive regulations to be applied could be 
analogized to a traditional conflict of laws problem, substituting the 
applicable states for adversarial parties.121 
 The importance of procedure was immediately recognized fol-
lowing GE/Honeywell, as the European Union pushed through 
changes to their merger analysis procedure in an attempt to bring it 
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into conformity with U.S. practices.122 Such advancements included 
alterations to the evidentiary standards necessary for determining the 
market dominance of a corporation, modernizing the actual en-
forcement of EU antitrust regulations and introducing stronger pro-
cedural guarantees and legal certainty.123 
 Similar gains in legal certainty and global uniformity can be 
gained through basic procedural developments by the WTO.124 Such a 
procedural framework would side-step many of the strong criticisms 
facing substantive antitrust policies, and could remedy the difficulties 
arising from the patchwork of multi-lateral agreements that include 
elements of competition policy.125 Continued usage of such multi-party 
agreements does not alleviate the problems raised through the devel-
opment of state-centric competition policies.126 Instead, filling the vac-
uum left in the absence of a WTO competition policy with multi-party 
agreements only bolsters conflict between national policies and com-
peting multi-party agreements.127 The effect of these conflicts is exhib-
ited by the mounting costs of compliance for multinational corpora-
tions.128 
 Most importantly, procedural regulations for merger analysis are 
an obtainable goal for the WTO, whereas substantive regulatory 
measures seem much less likely to succeed.129 There is a growing vari-
ance in national policies regarding merger analysis, with many states 
using merger policy as an instrument in national economic strategy.130 
States, such as China, may develop competition policies that allow for 
strategic blocking of foreign mergers in order to protect governmen-
tal interests in certain sensitive or strategic sectors populated by State-
controlled enterprises.131 Procedural regulations will, at a minimum, 
prevent the dangers resulting from such a “hold-up” scenario.132 Ide-
ally, results from such a procedural framework would allow for global 
legal certainty regarding merger analysis, ease tensions related to 
globalization, increase corporate planning, and eventually promote 
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efficient and lively competition within markets, passing along savings 
to consumers.133 That is, after all, the main goal sought by both sub-
stantive and procedural competition policies.134 
Conclusion 
 This analysis of the economically and politically damaging results 
of individualized state merger regulation illustrates the necessity of 
global antitrust regulations. The differing interpretations of the highly 
similar U.S. and EU antitrust regulations, as applied in the 
GE/Honeywell case, serve to highlight the dangers that exist in the ab-
sence of a global competition policy. The potential for enterprising 
states to take advantage of potential “hold-up” situations in key markets 
through cleverly crafted laws and restrictive merger regulation should 
signal a wake-up call to those resisting attempts at antitrust regulation 
by the WTO. Procedural regulations should be enacted that give cer-
tainty to corporations regarding mergers and efficient business struc-
turing to ultimately benefit consumers in today’s global marketplace. 
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